6 June 2005
Newton Garver
Bolivia: Preparing the third revolutionDuring the past two weeks there has again been an intense combination of turmoil and opportunity in Bolivia. The news reports have sometimes compared these recent events with those of October 2003, but the differences are significant and this year’s crisis cannot be resolved so easily as that of 2003. The main event in 2005 is a power play by the Indians of Bolivia, led by the Aymara, but there is also a counter power play by free-market entrepreneurs of Santa Cruz. The events of 2003 are indeed part of the prelude, but we cannot understand what is happening without taking note of the centuries of Spanish oppression, the earlier revolutions of 1952 and 1982, and differences between 2003 and 2005.
The Spaniards treated all of the Indians of South America as slaves, and people of European ancestry continue to compose the elite of Bolivia and to hold the reigns of power, even though indigenous peoples constitute between 65% and 70% of the population. The Indians were never content with their subjugation, but it is only since 1952 that there has been steady progress toward overcoming it.
During the 1940s several leftist-oriented political parties were organized. The most important of these was the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, or MNR), founded by young nationalist intellectuals and headed by Victor Paz Estenssoro, an economist and one-time close adviser to a previous president. The MNR opposed the power of the big mining companies and advocated freeing the Indian people from exploitation. In 1943 the MNR led a successful coup, encouraged unionization of tin mines, and tried to improve Indian living conditions. These efforts brought conflict with the tin barons, culminating in a bloody uprising in La Paz in 1946, and for the next six years the government remained in the hands of conservatives.
The First Revolution
In 1951, even though exiled in Argentina, Victor Paz won nearly half the presidential election vote. To prevent his installation, the government was placed under the control of a military junta. In 1952 a revolution by the MNR and the miners put him in the presidency, and the MNR began its program of profound social, economic, and political changes. It pledged to make the Indians full-fledged members of the national community, to free the country from control of the largely foreign-owned mining companies, to develop the economy, and to bring about real political democracy.
The MNR regime acted quickly. Beginning in August 1952 it extended the vote to all adults, legalized the formation of labor unions, and nationalized the major tin-mining companies. A year later, through its land reform law, it broke up the estates of the large landlords and transferred ownership of the small plots to Indian farmers (campesinos). It began extensive projects for education and founded medical clinics in the countryside and farm cooperatives among the peasants. The second MNR president, Hernán Siles Zuazo, came into office in 1956, and Victor Paz was returned to the presidency in 1960.
Prior to 1952 it was barely legal for Indians to attend independent schools. For example, Quakers began missionary work among the Indians in Bolivia in the 1920’s, and helped them establish schools beginning in the 1930s, but these first schools had to be clandestine. When the Constitution of 1952 was promulgated the number of Quaker schools quickly multiplied until there were about 50 serving primarily Aymara youth. It was in 1952 that the Indians were first recognized as citizens and began to participate in the political life of their country.
During its years in power (1952-64), the MNR provided Bolivia with the most stable and open government in the country's history. The press was free to criticize the government and did so energetically. Government changes in 1956 and 1960 were the result of elections, although there were frequent crises and many attempts to oust the MNR. Victor Paz Estenssoro’s second presidency was ended by a military coup in 1964, and the next eighteen years saw a succession of coups and juntas.
The Second Revolution
There was a second revolution in 1982. In 1980 General Luís García Meza seized power, suspended the constitution, and instituted a repressive regime. His opponents were arrested and killed, and many more fled abroad. The universities were closed. The army ousted García Meza in 1981, and moderate army leadership held power until former MNR president Hernán Siles Zuazo was installed as president by elections held in 1982. Presidential elections in 1985 returned Paz Estenssoro to the presidency. Since 1982, governments in Bolivia have been chosen by election with the participation of a wide range of political parties.
This has however not resulted in proportional power for the indigenous peoples, since political parties and elections require experience and financial resources lacking to the Indian populace. The last MNR president, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, continued strengthening public education, but he is an advocate of capitalism and globalization, policies that conflict not only with dominant interests of the Indians but also with the economic policies of Victor Paz. He served as president from 1993 to 1997 and was re-elected in 2002 but then forced to resign by a popular uprising in 2003. (See "Bolivia in Turmoil," Buffalo Report 17 October 2003, and "Bolivia at a Crossroads" Bolivia at a Crossroads,” Buffalo Report 5 December 2003.)
The Growth of Aymara Political Power
The reforms of the MNR in the revolutions of 1952 and 1982 made possible the growth and consolidation of Indian political power that now begins to eclipse the MNR. During the past decade two Indian leaders have become especially prominent, both Aymara. They are Felipe Quispe, known as “El Mallku”, a member of Parliament and leader of a significant party whose power base is the Aymara farmers of the Altiplano (especially north of the capital around the cities of Achacachi and Sorata and the towns of Warisata and Pucarani); and Evo Morales, also a member of Parliament and leader of another significant political party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), whose power base is the unions, (particularly the miners and coca growers). Quispe and Morales are often political opponents, particularly when seeking the allegiance of residents of El Alto, the sprawling burgeoning city of 800,000 on the Altiplano just above La Paz, where recent events have revealed a third powerful Indian political force, FEJUVE. What all three have in common is a determination that Indian interest not be swept aside by political and economic policies. There has been an overwhelming support for this common element among the Indians, particularly among the Aymara, even though there has been some questioning of specific demands and specific tactics.
The chief tactic, invented by Quispe, at least in its application to politics in Bolivia, has been roadblocks. These roadblocks are simple low-tech affairs, consisting of rocks across the main highways. The Indians who put up these roadblocks visit the roadblocks on a daily basis and confront soldiers or anyone who attempts to remove them. Quispe initiated roadblocks early in 2003 on the roads north of La Paz, cutting the road from La Paz through Achacachi (an often restless Aymara city on the Altiplano) to Sorata, a center for trekking and other tourism at the foot of Mt. Illampu, northern anchor of the Cordillera Royal. The isolation of Sorata prompted the government to evacuate tourists by means of military helicopters, resulting in a skirmish in which some dozen Indians were killed. These deaths led to increasing Aymara support, including that of Morales, for Quispe’s blockades, which deprived the capital city of La Paz of fuel and other supplies. When President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozaro ordered the military to escort oil trucks into the city on October 12, there was a major clash in the indigenous city of El Alto, resulting in 3 dozen deaths. This action infuriated the whole country, and during the following week half a dozen cities were on strike demanding the resignation of Sánchez, which duly occurred on Friday October 17.
Felipe Quispe had initiated the blockades of 2003 demanding revision of the contracts for exploitation of gas reserves by international consortiums, but what led to the massive protest was the shedding of Indian blood in El Alto. I witnessed marches and demonstrations throughout that week, and on the third and fourth days I felt confident enough to go out and watch from the side of the street, since the marches were well disciplined and entirely peaceful. The insistent demand at the time was for the resignation of the President, and hence the immediate crises was easy to resolve. The underlying crises did not however disappear. The Indians have a strong sense of foreigners having repeatedly come to Bolivia to take away their riches and leave them nothing. For two centuries, Bolivia was the main source for Europe’s silver and more than 100,000 Indians and Africans died in the rich mines at Potosí, which in the seventeenth century was the largest and richest city in the Americas in spite of being at an altitude of over 15,000 feet. After silver, it was guano, which Chile took along with Bolivia’s coastline. And then it was tin. Now that Bolivia has been found to possess the second largest reserve of natural gas in South America, the Indians are determined that this resource not be taken away as in the past, with no benefit to themselves. This determination is without a doubt a result of the awakening that began with the revolution of 1952.
The Demands of 2005
The specific demands with which the Bolivian Parliament is confronted at the beginning of June are complex and in part contradictory. There are three specific demands, two of them presented by the Indians of western Bolivia, and one by the entrepreneurs of eastern Bolivia. The two demands from western Bolivia are demands by the Indians that they count for more than they have in the past. One is a demand that the hydrocarbon resources of the country be nationalized, with a view to their exploitation by Bolivia rather than an international consortium. The other is a demand for a Constitutional convention, with a view to increasing and institutionalizing the role of impoverished Indians in the government of Bolivia, and hence also in the determination of policies pertaining to natural gas reserves and other resources. The third demand comes from the entrepreneurial class around the city of Santa Cruz, and it calls for greater autonomy for the departments (states) of Bolivia, with a view to keeping the economic prosperity of Santa Cruz in that area rather than sharing it with the Indians on the Altiplano. Not surprisingly, Quispe, Morales, and FEJUVE are pressing the first two demands and opposing the third.
My involvement with Bolivia over the past six years has been primarily with Bolivian Quakers, nearly all 40,000 of whom are Aymara. I know some Bolivian Quakers who are middle class, including one who is an M.D. and works for U.S. Aid on the control of infectious diseases, one who was Undersecretary of Education in a previous government, and some professionals such as teachers and architects. For the professionals an income of six or eight hundred dollars a month is very good. Most of the Quakers I know, and the vast majority in Bolivia, hardly make that amount in a year. I have helped arrange higher education (post-secondary) scholarships for Bolivian Quakers, and their applications more often than not reveal that their parents’ income is less than the meager scholarship of fifty dollars per month. Generally, the family home is in the country on the Altiplano with subsistence farming, and the house has no electricity, no heat, no running water, and dirt floors. Vast numbers of these peasants are moving into cities, very often to get a better education and more economic opportunity, but unemployment is widespread, underemployment is virtually universal, and poverty is extreme. This is the background for the Indian demands that are making today’s headlines and preparing the way for a third revolution.
There are significant differences between the Indian demands of 2003 and those of 2005. In 2003 there was no realistic prospect that the departure of President Sánchez would result in greater economic well-being or institutional power for the Indians. It was certain that he would be replaced by another member of the elite, as indeed happened. In 2005, the demands are specifically aimed at improving economic well-being and strengthening the institutional power of the Indians. Hence the demands of 2005 are far more difficult to achieve, partly because they involve working out a host of details and partly because the elite (including the new entrepreneurs in Santa Cruz) have more to lose this time. Another difference is that the marches and demonstrations of 2003 were generally nonviolent, and almost completely so after the first day. In 2005, there have been more incidents of violence and more threats of violence. Demonstrators have broken the windshields of busses and taxis that tried to operate during the final days of May and the first days of June, peaceful Aymara marchers were attacked with clubs and stones in Santa Cruz last week, and there have been threats of taking over the Parliament or burning it down. The combination of the vast difficulty of achieving the demands and the increased threat of violence makes the situation in 2005 more ominous than that of 2003, as well as more important for the future of Bolivia.
The demands from eastern Bolivia for more Departmental autonomy (roughly, more States’ rights), which are not Indian demands at all, add a complication that is difficult to assess. As with the other demands, the details make a great deal of difference, for autonomy can mean many different things. Furthermore the specific tactics that might be used are uncertain. Altogether missing from the demands so far described are the interests of those in southern Bolivia, around Tarija, where the gas reserves are located and where the populace has benefited economically from the investments of the foreign oil companies. Tarija might be inclined to support the demands for autonomy from Santa Cruz, but so far has not mounted any well-publicized campaign along that line.
Rising to the Challenge
The two great needs of Bolivia at the present time are for more power and respect for the native peoples and more economic activity that benefits the whole country. How to integrate those two requirements is and will remain an enormous challenge. Rising to meet that challenge, if such occurs, will constitute the third Bolivian revolution. Like the first two it will have to be a revolution of the left, leading to more power to the Indians, less poverty and oppression, and less exploitation by foreign corporations. It is not likely to be popular in Washington.
The incumbent president, Carlos Mesa (see "The Anti-political Politician: Reflections on Bolivia," Buffalo Report, 26 March 2005), was the running-mate of President Sánchez in 2002 and succeeded to the presidency when Sánchez resigned. His background is an historian and a television journalist. He is thoroughly legitimate, but he lacks ordinary political instincts, has never personally been elected to office, is not a member of any political party, and has so far refused to use armed forces to break up demonstrations, marches, or blockades. Political analysts generally consider him weak, based, I am convinced, on their macho confusion of strength with dominance and their equally macho blindness to the difference between dominance and endurance. Mesa aims at conciliation rather than domination, and he seems determined to serve out his mandate until the presidential elections of 2007.
On June 3 the Catholic Church, at the invitation of President Mesa, offered to facilitate discussions among the contending parties, contingent on the parties putting aside violence and showing respect for one another during the talks, and Mesa set October 16 as the date for both a referendum on autonomy and the election of delegates to a Constitutional convention. These steps further prepare the way for a third revolution to occur in Bolivia, with even less bloodshed than those of 1952 and 1982. But of course dark forces still lurk in the wings.
Copyright 2005 by Buffalo Report, Inc.